I. Introduction
As the world worries about the Zika virus and other outbreaks, Haiti, a Caribbean country with a population of approximately 11 million has been battling a cholera epidemic, 2 which scientific evidence confirms was brought to the island by United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. Though celebrated as the world's first black republic, the country is perhaps more recognized globally for the 2010 earthquake, the subsequent influx of international aid and ongoing efforts to rebuild. Indeed, the mention of 'Haiti' is often accompanied with the tag line 'the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere'; only the rare speaker attempts to situate this poverty in a broader historical and geopolitical context. The cholera epidemic is, arguably and unfortunately, just the latest in a string of externally-imposed challenges that the Haitian government and its people have faced since independence. 3 Over the last six years, hundreds of thousands of Haitians and Haitian-Americans have been affected by what is now recognized as the worst cholera epidemic in recent history. 4 Data from the UN indicates that at least 9,496 people have died and another 806,000 have been infected 5 since UN peacekeepers from Nepal recklessly dumped fecal waste contaminated with the Vibrio cholerae bacteria into a tributary of Haiti's most important river, the Artibonite, in October 2010. 6 Despite the international dimensions of this catastrophe, the decentralized system of international law with its 'paradox of objectives ', 7 seems to offer cholera victims 8 no avenue for redress. There is no international court to which they could bring their claims and their efforts to file a claim with the claims unit of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti Similarly, Katarina Lundahl has written about the conflict between victims' lack of access to dispute resolution mechanisms and the UN's immunity from suit, arguing that this has resulted in a 'remedy gap' which only 'political action' can resolve.
11 Even Bruce C Rashkow, Former Director of the General Legal Division of the UN's Office of Legal Affairs characterises the situation as one that raises significant questions about UN immunity. 12 Although it seems like the hard law principle of immunity trumps the much softer human rights issue, is the victims' quest for justice really futile?
This paper argues that the time-honored practice of diplomatic protection may offer a solution that allows for UN accountability even within international law. Although traditional diplomatic protection would likely only offer a remedy to Haitian-Americans, if at all, this paper argues that the cholera epidemic and the UN's refusal to accept the victims' claims demonstrates both the limits and the potential of diplomatic protection.
II. Background
Haitians experienced cholera-an acute diarrheal disease caused by food and water contaminated with the Vibrio cholera bacterium-for the first time in October 2010. 13 This was just a few months after a devastating 7.0 magnitude earthquake left at least 316,000 people dead, 300,000 injured and 1.3 million displaced, in addition to destroying 97,294 houses and damaging another 188,383 in the capital, Port-au-Prince, and surrounding areas.
14 The first cholera cases were reported in mid-October along the Artibonite River in Although they were coming from regions of Nepal that were experiencing a cholera outbreak, 17 they were not tested immediately prior to their departure. 18 In addition, the base's water and sanitation system was poorly maintained, leaving waste from the showers and toilets to drain into the Meye, a tributary of the Artibonite River. 19 To make matters worse, MINUSTAH contracted a company which would dump untreated waste containing human feces into an open septic pit nearby, from which it could flow into the tributary when it rained. 20 Initially, an independent panel of experts appointed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2011 claimed that the MINUSTAH peacekeepers were not at fault. In their final report, the experts suggested that the outbreak resulted from contamination of the Meye Tributary of the Artibonite River with a South Asian strain of Vibrio cholerae. 21 The experts concluded that 'the Haiti cholera outbreak was caused by the confluence of circumstances as described above, and was not the fault of, or deliberate action of, a group or individual'. 22 However, in a more recent report supported by more extensive research, the members of the panel suggest that 'the preponderance of the evidence and the weight of the circumstantial evidence does lead to the conclusion that personnel associated with the Mirebalais MINUSTAH facility were the most likely source of introduction of cholera into Haiti'. 23 The panel references research by other experts to support their findings. 24 Taken together, the
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sources reveal that the Haiti cholera strain was found to be a 'perfect match' to a Nepal strain isolated in 2010.
25
In November 2011, over 5,000 cholera victims attempted to file a claim with the MINUSTAH claims unit and the UN Secretary-General. 26 They sought relief in the form of: (1) the establishment of a standings claims commission; (2) measures by the UN to improve the water and sanitation system and to provide adequate health services in order to prevent the further spread of cholera; (3) compensation; and (4) a public apology. 27 When it finally responded in February 2013, the UN asserted that the claims were 'not receivable' because they 'would necessarily include a review of political and policy matters'. 36 Like the lower court, the appellate court rejected the plaintiffs-appellants' argument that the UN's obligations under Section 29 were a condition precedent to its enjoyment of immunity. 37 As such, the judgments reinforce the notion that unless the Secretary-General waives immunity, the UN enjoys absolute immunity from suit. The period for the plaintiff-appellants to appeal the Second Circuit decision has lapsed.
38
III. The Arguments About UN Immunity From Suit
The US Government, which filed a Statement of Interest in the case and appeared in court for the oral arguments in both the lower court and Second Circuit, asserted that the UN has absolute immunity to suit. 39 The Government informed the court that its Statement of Interest was made 'pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, consistent with the United States' obligations as host nation to the UN and as a party to treaties governing the privileges and immunities of the UN'.
40
A. Sources of UN Immunity
In the District Court, the US government based its argument on immunity primarily on two treaties, namely, the UN Charter and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN (commonly referred to as 'the General Convention'). It also referenced an agreement signed between the UN and the Haitian government following the Security Council's passage of Resolution 1542 creating MINUSTAH in April 2004. 41 However, the plaintiffs argued that the government selectively read out a provision of the General Convention which conditions this immunity on the provision of avenues for redress. 
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Article 105(1) of the UN Charter, a multilateral treaty that is the most authoritative source of international law, 43 states that '[t]he Organisation shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes'. This is echoed in Section 2 of the General Convention whereby, '[t]he United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity'. 44 The July 2004 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed by the UN and the government of Haiti also stipulates that 'MINUSTAH, its property, funds and assets, and its members, including the Special Representative, shall enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in the present Agreement as well as those provided for in the Convention'. 45 The plaintiffs argued that the UN's immunity is conditioned on the provision of alternative modes of redress and, in their situation, on the establishment of a standing claims commission as stipulated in the SOFA, which reads as follows:
'Except as provided in paragraph 57, 46 any dispute or claim of a private-law character, not resulting from the operational necessity of MINUSTAH, to which MINUSTAH or any member thereof is a party and over which the courts of Haiti do not have jurisdiction because of any provision of the present Agreement shall be settled by a standing claims commission to be established for that purpose'. 47 The plaintiffs asserted that rather than granting absolute immunity, Section 2 of the General Convention is conditioned by Section 29 according to which, '[t]he United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which the United Nations is a party'. 48 Brief] ('By focusing solely on Section 2 and ignoring Section 29, the Government offers an unreasonably fragmented reading of the CPIUN.'). 43 The plaintiffs reiterated these arguments on appeal to the Second Circuit. 49 Although the UN did not appear, the US government asserted the UN's immunity by appearing as amicus curiae.
50
B. Significance of Lack of a Remedy for Plaintiffs-appellants
Thus, the plaintiffs-appellants and the US government had radically different views on the significance of access to a remedy. On the one hand, for the government, whether or not the plaintiffs-appellants had access to a remedy was immaterial because the only exception to UN immunity is an 'express' waiver of immunity by the organisation itself. 51 On the other hand, the plaintiffs-appellants claimed that access to a remedy was crucial to a finding of UN immunity-that is, 'compliance with Section 29 must be interpreted as a condition precedent to UN immunity'.
52
The plaintiffs-appellants' lawyers' views were shared by a group of European amici who suggested that not only does the UN's immunity solely flow from functional necessity, 53 but that the US court should draw on the practice of the 
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sections of this paper consider whether diplomatic protection might provide an alternative avenue for such a remedy.
IV. Diplomatic Protection: A 'Precursor'
to International Human Rights Law
In 1924, Greece brought proceedings to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), seeking reparations from Great Britain for its alleged failure to recognise the concessions granted to its national, Mr. Mavrommatis, by the Ottoman authorities. 59 In its decision, the PCIJ stated: 'It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels'. 60 Although diplomatic protection dates back to the late 18 th and early 19 th century, 61 this significant pronouncement by the PCIJ marks the beginning of the recognition of diplomatic protection in international law.
The practice arose in a colonial context and was largely used by European States seeking to protect their citizens from alleged mistreatment in foreign States. At times, this 'protection' included armed intervention that undoubtedly served additional ends. 62 As a result of the dubious uses of diplomatic protection, many Latin American countries, who were subjected to constant complaints concerning injury to Europeans inhabiting their territories, came to view it as a tool used by stronger countries against weaker ones, leading many Latin American theorists and practitioners, like the Argentinian scholar and diplomat Carlos Calvo, to strongly oppose it. 63 This vehement and reasoned objection led to various Latin American countries inserting what became known as 'Calvo Clauses' in their constitutions and other instruments. 64 Through these clauses, States rejected the imposition of preferential treatment of foreigners, asserting that they should be entitled only to the same treatment as nationals, thereby ensuring that European States related to their Latin American counterparts in the same way that they did with each other. 65 Over time, diplomatic protection came to be more commonly used even by countries in the Global South 66 and now it is recognised as forming part of customary international law. The International Law Commission (ILC) began to codify the doctrine in the 1990s, leading to the current Draft Articles of Diplomatic Protection. 67 Article 1 defines diplomatic protection as the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.
68
In addition to the requirement of the commission of an 'internationally wrongful act', the draft articles and previous practice establish the fundamental requirements to exercising this 'diplomatic action' or related procedures, which includes: (1) the establishment of a legal interest; and (2) the exhaustion of local remedies by the injured national.
69
A. Establishing a State Interest
In keeping with the State-centric nature of international law, States can only establish a legal interest in the injury of an individual based on nationality, with the only exception being that they can choose to exercise this protection for a stateless person or refugee residing in the State at the time of the injury. 70 Concerned by the possibility of people changing their nationality for convenience, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) established the requirement of a 'genuine connection' between the person and the State. 71 Prior to World War II, Friedrich Nottebohm, a German national, had briefly left Guatemala, his residence of more than 30 years, and had established a business with his brothers. 72 After the war broke out, he wanted to return and, in order to do so, sought a neutral nationality. 73 Despite not having spent much time in the country, Lichtenstein approved his application for 66 Ibid, But see Shan, supra nt 64, 163 ('Calvo has been significantly changed, or substantially "disfigured", or generally "deactivated", but [is] not yet completely "dead". When political and economic climates are "right", it could be re-activated again and "resurge", as what seems to be happening'). 
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naturalisation. 74 However, the State's effort to compel Guatemala to recognise this citizenship was unsuccessful because the ICJ found that the requisite connection between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein was missing. 75 Thus, the case highlighted the fact that despite diplomatic protection developing as a tool to protect individuals, the State, and not the individual, remained the subject of international law. Only a State with which Nottebohm had a 'genuine connection' could exercise this protection. Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss jurist among the first scholars to write about this practice, commented in 1758: 'Whoever ill-treats a citizen injures the State, which must protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or punish him'. 76 At the heart of diplomatic protection is the fiction that the State has been injured and, as a consequence, is asserting its own rights.
77
B. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Article 14 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection elaborates on the requirement that an individual exhaust local remedies before a State exercises diplomatic protection on his or her behalf. 78 According to Article 14(2) local remedies are 'legal remedies which are open to an injured person before the judicial or administrative courts or bodies, whether ordinary or special, of the State alleged to be responsible for causing injury'. Although there is some 74 Ibid, 16. 75 Ibid, 23 ('A State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with this general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's genuine connection with the State which assumes the defence of its citizens by means of protection as against other States'). 76 Amerasinghe, supra nt 61, 10. 77 E.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, at 12 ('By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights -its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law'). See also Preliminary Rep. on Diplomatic Protection, supra nt 67, paras 21-26; Vermeer-Künzli, A, "As If:
The Legal Fiction in Diplomatic Protection" 18(1) European Journal of International Law (2007) 37. This is markedly different from the view held by renowned jurist, Hersch Lauterpacht, who suggested that: 'The position of the individual as a subject of international law has often been obscured by the failure to observe the distinction between the recognition, in an international instrument, of rights to the benefit of the individual and the enforceability of these rights at his instance. The fact that the beneficiary of rights is not authorized to take independent steps in his own name to enforce them does not signify that he is not a subject of the law or that the rights in question are vested exclusively in the agency which possesses the capacity to enforce them. Thus in relation to the current view that the rights of the alien within foreign territory are the rights of his State and not his own, the correct way of stating the legal position is not that the State asserts its own exclusive right but that it enforces, in substance, the right of the individual who, as the law now stands, is incapable of asserting it in the international sphere'. INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1950) . 78 See also Borchard, supra nt 69, 149 ('The question must always be answered, therefore, whether the claimant State has been injured and ordinarily, though not necessarily always, it is a condition precedent to establishing such injury that it should be shown that the national of the claimant State has exhausted the local remedies which were made available to him by the law of the State from which he is alleged to have suffered injury'). disagreement as to whether this constitutes a procedural or substantive requirement 79 and about when exhaustion is required, 80 Article 15 is clear about the exceptions to the requirement, namely:
(a) there are no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such redress; (b) there is undue delay in the remedial process which is attributable to the State alleged to be responsible; (c) there was no relevant connection between the injured person and the State alleged to be responsible at the date of injury; (d) the injured person is manifestly precluded from pursuing local remedies; or (e) the State alleged to be responsible has waived the requirement that local remedies be exhausted.
This requirement of the exhaustion of local remedies is an effort to protect State sovereignty. 81 As suggested in the Interhandel case, the defendant State must be given a chance to attempt to remedy the situation before another State invokes its responsibility for violating international law. 82 However, as US Secretary of State Hamilton Fish is reported to have said, '[a] claimant in a foreign State is not required to exhaust justice in such State when there is no justice to exhaust'.
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C. The Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights Nexus
Many scholars agree that diplomatic protection and international human rights law pursue similar ends. Diplomatic protection was developed largely as a means of ensuring that States adhered to international minimum standards, but it has now evolved to include a broader scope of rights guaranteed in international human rights law. 84 According to VermeerKünzli, 79 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, Second Rep. on Diplomatic Protection, Int'l Law Comm'n, paras 53-66, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/514 (Feb. 28, 2001) (by Dugard, JR) (on the debate between the proceduralists, substantivists, and what Professor Dugard calls the 'third school'). 80 Amerasinghe, supra nt 61, 38-41. 81 Borchard, supra nt 69, 176. 82 Interhandel (Switz. v U.S.), Preliminary Objections, 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27 (Mar. 21) (The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well established rule of customary international law; the rule has been generally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its national whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in violation of international law. Before resort may be had to an international court in such a situation, it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system') 83 Borchard, supra nt 69, 154. 84 Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Rep. of Guinea v Dem. Rep. Congo), Preliminary Objections, 2007 I.C.J. 582, 599 (May 24) ('Owing to the substantive development of international law over recent decades in respect of the rights it accords to individuals, the scope ratione materiae of diplomatic protection, originally limited to alleged violations of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens, has subsequently widened to include, inter alia, internationally guaranteed human rights'); Amerasinghe, supra nt 61, 73-74.
[it] was an instrument for the protection of human rights avant la lettre, because the rights that diplomatic protection protected were not always classified as human rights, and because individuals were not considered holders of rights. Nevertheless, diplomatic protection proved an effective means to protect individuals against abuses at the hands of States.
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In fact, in contexts where human rights protections for foreigners are ineffective, diplomatic protection may offer the only means of protection. Professor John Dugard has suggested that '[m]ost States will treat a claim of diplomatic protection from another State more seriously than a complaint against its conduct to a human rights monitoring body'.
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The potential effectiveness of this procedure coupled with the growing recognition of international human rights law raises the question of whether States in fact have a duty to protect their nationals in this way. The exercise of diplomatic protection by States has largely been left to the discretion of individual States. 87 Rather than creating an obligation, the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection recommend that States 'give due consideration to the possibility of exercising diplomatic protection, especially when a significant injury has occurred'. 88 Although both the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutional Court of South Africa have also grappled with this question, both courts ultimately decided to leave decisions regarding diplomatic protection to the discretion of the Executive. 89 The majority in the Constitutional Court rejected the argument that diplomatic protection is a human right. 90 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in his concurring opinion, Justice Sandile Ngcobo wrote the following:
there is in my view, a compelling argument for the proposition that States have, not only a right but, a legal obligation to protect their nationals abroad against an egregious violation of their human rights. Those States that have ratified international human rights instruments and are committed to the promotion and protection of international human rights have a special duty in this regard.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Catherine O'Regan, joined by Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, emphasised that there was, in fact, a duty, based on the South African Constitution, for the State to provide diplomatic protection to its citizens. 92 However, this view does not seem to be shared not only in individual States, but in the broader international community. 
V. The Exercise of Diplomatic Protection for Cholera Victims
Clearly, the introduction of cholera into Haiti is a wrongful act that violates international human rights law. It constitutes a violation of several rights guaranteed in the International Bill of Human Rights and other instruments, including the rights to water, health, life and, thus far, the right to an effective remedy. 93 Furthermore, scientific data suggests that it is an act that can be attributed to Nepalese peacekeepers who were, arguably, under the 'effective control' of the UN. The peacekeepers' conduct also violated international humanitarian relief standards, including the core 'do no harm' principle. 94 All of these factors suggest that the UN's action 95 meet the requirements for 'an internationally wrongful act of an international organization', as described in Articles 4 and 7 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. 96 Yet, why is the UN not being held accountable? While the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection lay out a clear framework for the exercise of diplomatic protection by one State against another, they are silent about its assertion by a State against an international organisation. Judge Krylor feared that this possibility would arise, inversely, after the ICJ found that the UN could make claims on behalf of its agents. 97 The judge was right, but so far the instances have been few and far between. 98 Zwanenberg suggests that while many of the requirements and modalities may be the same in both cases of diplomatic protection, some, like the requirement of the exhaustion of local remedies, cannot be easily applied when the responsibility of international organisations is being invoked. 99 Here, perhaps such exhaustion should entail the exhaustion of the organisations' own claims settlement procedures. 100 Despite these gaps, the cholera epidemic in Haiti seems to exemplify a grave injury to Haitian and Haitian-Americans for which States should, as the Draft Articles suggest, 'give due consideration to the possibility of exercising diplomatic protection'. 101 Thus, it is not surprising that, in an article about UN responsibility for cholera in Haiti, Professor Frédéric Mégret briefly alludes to the possibility that Haiti could exercise diplomatic protection on judiciary 110 suggest that attempts at legal redress would be futile. Does this not exemplify a denial of justice that should hasten diplomatic protection? Returning to Secretary Fish, there seems to be 'no justice to exhaust'. 111 The US could also potentially exercise protection of its citizens who have been affected by the cholera epidemic, some of whom have already filed suit in the US. But, as considered above, does the US have any duty to do so? The Commentary to Article 2 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection suggests that '[a] State has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so. The internal law of a State may oblige a State to extend diplomatic protection to a national, but international law imposes no such obligation'. 112 US jurisprudence and the US Constitution imply such an obligation. In Marbury v. Madison, the Court suggested that
[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.
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Some years later, the Court emphasised that this right was not simply reserved for citizens, stating:
The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each State to the citizens of all other States to the precise extent that it is allowed to its own citizens. Equality of treatment in this respect is not left to depend upon comity between the States, but is granted and protected by the Federal Constitution. 114 This right of access to courts can be located in the Due Process Clauses (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments), the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Article Four) and the Petition Clause (First Amendment). 115 It is also recognised in at least 40 State constitutions. 116 This suggests that the US has a responsibility to protect at least its citizens, but also possibly its neighbours' fundamental right of access by, at a minimum, ceasing to intervene on the UN's behalf.
VI. Overcoming UN Immunity
As a world power with significant political and economic resources at its disposal, the US could likely effectively exercise diplomatic protection in one or more of the ways suggested by 'diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement' in Article 1 of the Draft Articles. 117 It could probably bring the UN to the negotiating table in a way that Haiti would be unable to. However, if the US opted to use judicial dispute settlement, it would still be confronted with the challenge posed by UN immunity.
In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ grappled with the issues raised by Italian courts allowing Italian citizens to bring civil claims against Germany for the German Reich's violations of international humanitarian law during World War II. 118 Italy alleged that the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the German government violated jus cogens and that the claimants lacked any other avenue for redress. Therefore, it argued, Germany was no longer entitled to State immunity. 119 The court rejected Italy's argument, stating:
This argument therefore depends upon the existence of a conflict between a rule, or rules, of jus cogens, and the rule of customary law which requires one State to accord immunity to another. In the opinion of the Court, however, no such conflict exists. Assuming for this purpose that the rules of the law of armed conflict which prohibit the murder of civilians in occupied territory, the deportation of civilian inhabitants to slave labour and the deportation of prisoners of war to slave labour are rules of jus cogens, there is no conflict between those rules and the rules on State immunity. The two sets of rules address different matters. The rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. 120 The court distinguished this procedural aspect from the determination of the merits. 121 Ultimately, it rejected the notion that State immunity might be conditioned on the provision of alternate remedies. 122 The court's finding that even jus cogens violations could not trump State immunity does not bode well for the cholera plaintiffs.
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However, in an interesting twist on October 22, 2014, the Italian Constitutional Court 123 rendered a decision deeming that effect cannot be given to the ICJ decision because it violates the country's fundamental constitutional principles, including the right of access to justice. 124 This means that Italian national courts can proceed to hear the merits of the dispute. Thus, ironically, although it facilitates access to the courts, the Italian Constitutional Court decision violates international law in light of the ICJ ruling.
As the plaintiffs-appellants and amici in Georges v. United Nations argue, the US's assertions about absolute immunity seem to counter the organisation's own principles and the values that it is promoting around the world. A 1954 ICJ advisory opinion provides an apt example. The General Assembly had requested an opinion regarding whether the General Assembly had the right to decline to effectuate a compensation award from the UN Administrative Tribunal to an employee terminated without his assent and, if so, it sought clarification on the main legal basis for this right. 125 In response, the ICJ opined that '[t]he Charter contains no provision which authorizes any of the principal organs of the United Nations to adjudicate upon these disputes, and Article 105 secures for the United Nations jurisdictional immunities in national courts. It would, in the opinion of the Court, hardly be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to promote freedom and justice for individuals and with the constant preoccupation of the United Nations Organization to promote this aim that it should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the settlement of any disputes which may arise between it and them'. 126 It would not be too much of a stretch to argue that this obligation to ensure a remedy for staff members, which reflects the ideals expressed in the UN Charter, 127 equally applies to Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection recognise the legal personality of corporations, 134 they are yet to recognise the invocation of responsibility of international organisations for breaches of international law. Perhaps it is too early, given the continued predominance of the State within the international system, to suggest that the scope of diplomatic protection be expanded beyond nationality. However, at a minimum, in light of the power dynamics at play in Haiti, where the international organisation in question is also involved in statebuilding, reconstruction and fundraising, diplomatic protection should be re-imagined to not only recognise the different stakes involved in its exercise against international organisations, but to ensure, as Latin American countries sought to do years ago, that there is a level playing field for States desiring to protect their nationals. While political action might, as Lundahl suggests, provide an avenue for redress, the lex lata must evolve to enhance the conditions of possibility for justice for individuals and families, like the named plaintiff, Delama Georges, whose lives have been devastated by the cholera epidemic. * www.grojil.org
